I. The Beginning of the Modern Age
In the history of the literary canon, Hamlet often marks the demarcation that signals the beginning of the modern age. Hamlet reveals his interiority and introspection in his soliloquies drawing attention to what is going on inside of him. While he carries the name of his father, Hamlet differs sharply from the ghost dressed in the regal vestiges of the Arthurian knight. That the young Hamlet retains this status despite the constant evolution in the modern conception of subjectivity is quite astonishing demonstrating that some works of art remain timeless as a tool to interpret each successive period.
The story of Hamlet inverts antiquity’s fixation on the plot. Hamlet is placed into a charged plotline where he has been dispossessed of his throne by his mother’s remarriage to his uncle. The ghost of his father visits Hamlet to assure him of his murder. In the conventional formulation of the tragic plot, the protagonist takes action to gain their revenge. In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the effect is not action but endless reasoning and hesitation. The focus shifts from the plot to the character with Shakespeare championing Hamlet through Horatio who exclaims on Hamlet’s death, ’Now cracks a noble heart. Goodnight, sweet Prince/And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest’ (5.2.343). “We forget the murder of the King, the villainy of Claudius, the guilt of Gertrude; our recollection dwells only on the memory of that ‘sweet prince.’”
Character is not only emphasized as superior to the plot, but becomes independent of it and forms the fundamental aspect of examination. A long history of critique focuses on explaining Hamlet’s delay. This key moment in the play finds Claudius, the usurper, kneeling in prayer as Hamlet creeps upon him, prepares his sword and utters, “Now might I do it. But now ‘a is a-praying” (3.3.72). After deliberation, Hamlet sheathes his sword concluding this revenge is unsatisfactory as Claudius has absolved himself of his sins while Hamlet’s father died “grossly full of bread” (3.3.80). In other words, the older Hamlet dies unprepared for the auditing of his life in its immediate aftermath while in this moment Claudius is potentially saved. The books are not balanced and this is the justification that Hamlet gives in foregoing this opportunity.
In pre-nineteenth century criticism, the delay is focused on as a tool of the plot necessary to extend the play. This “problem” emerged fully for psychoanalysis and exploration of the modern consciousness in the nineteenth century as a problem of individual character divorced from the plot. The reasons contrived range from an acute emotional or mental state that later interpretations developed into disorders, pathologies, and neuroses. What follows is a condensed literary review of Hamlet’s interiority and the emergence of modern consciousness.
II. Interiority, Action, and Delay in Hamlet
The critics’ main complaint with Hamlet is his constant failure to act. In the climatic moment of the play when Hamlet is presented with the opportunity to avenge his father and kill his uncle, Hamlet delays, justifying himself in the immediate aftermath saying, “And am I then revenged/To take him in the purging of his soul/When he is fit and seasoned for his passage?/No” (3.3.77).
It’s clear the delay was important to Shakespeare as it involved the most significant modification for his version of Hamlet, but what causes the delay is the gift that keeps on giving for scholars free to interject their preferred explanation. The scholarship around Hamlet’s delay is vast and interpretations in a real sense reflect the cultural Zeitgeist. It is the stuttering and stopping and moving forward that gives Hegel an “apt allegory for the dialectical movement of the spirit of consciousness” where Hamlet’s irresolution suggests the movement of spirit, warring against itself as it struggles towards self-realization. In the end Hamlet yields his self-determining power to contingency.
Hegel focuses on a minor passage where Hamlet compares his father to a mole. While the ghost of his father implores Hamlet to swear to the mission of vengeance, Hamlet responds “Well said, old mole, canst work i’th’ earth so fast?” (1.5.161). Hegel employs this turn of phrase as an allegory to explain the progression of his historical dialectic and the emergence of modern consciousness. The “old mole” is identified with the progress of consciousness.
After Hegel, with the emergence of psychoanalysis, Freud, like Derrida, identifies the mole with the subterranean drive of the unconscious. However, it is a progression that Derrida distinguishes from Hegelian teleology. While Hegel’s “old mole” tunneled toward the light with increasing speed, the mole of the unconscious moves out of sync with consciousness, erupting sporadically to break new paths.
Once the delay is identified as the crux of the play, each new explanation increasingly interiorizes the understanding of the psyche. Margreta de Grazia notes that for nearly 200 years the question of the cause of the delay was not of prominent importance. The progression of interpretation for the delay begins with a rejection of any theory that locates the cause in external circumstances. It wasn’t until Samuel Coleridge took a ‘turn for philosophical criticism; informed by Hume’s phenomenalism and Kant’s transcendentalism, that Hamlet is understood as reflecting on the constitution of our own minds. In such a turn, genre disappears, and the concerns of tragedy and comedy and intermixing disappear. After Coleridge, criticism will increasingly look for psychological explanations for Hamlet’s strange and odd behavior.
A.C. Bradley argued that it is not philosophical introspection that delays Hamlet, but rather a pathological disorder where pathology services to explain other instances of Hamlet’s ineffectiveness. It is the takeover of teleology and a search for an action’s purpose rather than its cause that becomes the focus.
From Bradley, the exploration for an explanation reflected emerging theories on consciousness. Freud, who explains the delay in characteristic humility as a process of repression that “was a novelty, and nothing like it had ever before been recognized in mental life.” Like Hegel’s Hamlet, Freud’s could only go so far in understanding his psyche whereas Freud is the first to “have here translated into consciousness what had to remain unconscious” to Hamlet and to all who had experienced the play before. Freud offers the explanation that Claudius’ crime stirs in Hamlet the memory of his own parricidal and incestuous desires and the will to avenge his father is checked by Hamlet’s own guilty memories. Once the action of Hamlet is identified with the thwarting of intended action, the play serves as a dramatization of the psychic processes of inhibition checking impulse.
What emerged with Freud’s interpretation of Hamlet was a theory of consciousness that cannot reveal its motivations even to itself. “It is no longer a cogitating Cartesian mind observing its own workings”, but rather a Kantian world in which “relations to the self are mediated by categories of time and space, just as are relations to others and to the external world.” Certainty has given way to the hypothetical. This builds on Freud’s theory of repression where the unconscious is inaccessible to the conscious mind and explains why the introspective Hamlet could not understand the cause of his delay. This interpretation of self-deception on the part of Hamlet in the end undermines the belief “in the mind’s capacity to know its own desires and processes” and reveals “the limitations of introspection.”
In this line of interpretation, Jacques Lacan offers a new definition of modernity. Hamlet remains the play that shifted the domain of action from external to internal and from enactment to repression, but rather than representing an advance in society it signals a regression. For Lacan, Hamlet’s delay represents a profound realization that does not result in the attainment of its end but with the realization of its unattainability.
Derrida on the other hand critiques Hamlet’s drive to revenge and ultimate justice arguing as well that this concept is unknowable, but not because it is hidden from the conscious mind, but rather, that the conflicting parties will endlessly rehash their struggle in the claim of the original fault. Retracing the steps is endlessly reductive. Seeking to establish justice by reference to a final solution is flawed by reference to the disjointed nature of time that offers no unified site for the wrong in the past nor the embodied manifestation of the Just in the present.  “The time is out of joint” (1.5.186) and displaced in memory.
With the emphasis on psychoanalysis as critique, there is a movement away from the Hegelian ideal of absolute consciousness though it’s possible the exploration of the unconscious as a new frontier reveals this seemingly hidden space between us and Absolute Consciousness. It is this gulf between the known and unknowable that explains Hamlet’s inexplicable unawareness of his motives. Hamlet comes to represent a demonstration of man’s incapacity for self-knowledge and consequently, self-determination.
Once Hamlet is freed from the constraints of plot: time, place, and action, “he is free to escape not only his dramatic fiction but his historical period.” Each interpretation of the delay is suitable to the time in which Hamlet is interpreted. The two major meta-narratives of the nineteenth century used Hamlet as a tool to explain the progress of humanity. In the following section I will examine the meta-narratives of Hegel and Marx, who employed the “old mole” to demonstrate their dialectic of historical progress.
III. Human Freedom and the Metanarratives of the Nineteenth Century
A mole is a small fury mammal, virtually blind, with strong forefeet for burrowing through the earth. The mole is the character that Hegel choses for his analogy to demonstrate the spirit advancing dialectically through historical time toward the freedom of full consciousness or Absolute Spirit like a mole tunneling through the earth toward open light. This is Hegel’s 2500-year struggle to the summit of modern philosophy. “The old mole, like the spirit of consciousness, like Hamlet himself until the play’s end, tunnels arduously through earth toward the light that is the freedom of absolute self-determination.” Hegel substitutes the spirit of the times for the ghost of Hamlet’s father.
Hegel, as well as Marx, cited the analogy of the mole and Margreta de Grazia, in her work “‘Hamlet’ without Hamlet”, explores these two major nineteenth century narratives of progress. Hegel’s progress charted the development of the philosophical dialectic while Marx focused on historical progress through the class struggle producing the earthly conditions of economic production. Instead of consciousness, for Marx, the mole embodies the revolution. “The old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer-the Revolution.” For Marx, it is the spectre of Communism that is the “driving force of history” as it works itself through class struggle. The two metanarratives struggle towards different ends “yet the tunneling mole provides a concise allegory for the historical process along a rough-and-ready linear continuum toward an emancipatory end.”
For Hegel, history is progressive going “ever on and on.” As the spirit of consciousness approaches its goal it picks up momentum in the desire to achieve the goal of absolute consciousness. Hegel concludes his History of Philosophy by imploring the reader to follow the spirit of the times and grasp the mole that is within us as it burrows toward the light. In this way the mole is both Weltgeist and Zeitgesit as the spirit running through world history and the spirit driving the present moment.
In Hegel’s Aesthetics (1835), he examines the debate between antiquity and modernity and characterizes the driving force of Hamlet as focused inward in order to emphasize the modern “principle of subjectivity or self-assertion.” In Hamlet, there is no moral conflict as Claudius is guilty. It is the protagonist’s inward struggle that Shakespeare emphasizes focusing on what Hamlet “knows and wills.” This shift in focus signals the advance of modern consciousness beyond responsibility residing in action. Rather, focusing on what Hamlet knows and does on account of his will.
The model of the allegory is Hamlet as the titular character who stands between the epochs of modernity and the Middle Ages. The new mode of being in Hamlet inverts the classical formula put forth by Aristotle stressing the primacy of plot and action. Instead, Hamlet represents introspection and intellectual activity and as a consequence, an aversion to real action.
Hamlet serves to describe this trajectory dramatizing the struggle of consciousness to attain self-determination and the tragic failure to do so. The dispossession of Hamlet’s kingdom creates the condition for his emancipation and inaugurates the modern epoch. Hegel assigns Hamlet the role in his Aesthetics that is reserved for Luther in Philosophy of History and Descartes in History of Philosophy making the great leap forward. All three figures pull away from “the contingent and material” fastening “on to thought, faith, and doubt” advancing toward the end of absolute consciousness.
Hegel marks the arrival of the modern age with Luther’s Great Schism breaking from the medieval past with the doctrine that divinity resides inwardly in spirit rather than in any external form. Luther breaks from the fixation of Christianity on the recapture of the Holy Land locating divinity within and accessible to the individual. Luther demonstrated that Christendom’s desire for the conquest of the Holy Land was misplaced, and the Reformation put an end to this earthbound devotion turning instead to the limitless soul and gained a comprehension of its own principle of subjective infinite freedom. It is toward the realization of this principle that modern history progresses.
In “The Difference between Ancient and Modern Dramatic Poetry,” Hegel makes a division between plot determined by fate and the character of the modern play who is self-determined struggling towards the future of absolute consciousness. In another turn from antiquity’s focus on fate as the driver of the play’s action, Hamlet’s interiority emanates from him and this becomes the driving force of play. It is an emphasis in one’s capacity for self-determination that signals another shift from the past to the modernity.
For Marx, the break also occurs in the sixteenth century catalyzed by dissociation from the land. He charts the course of feudal domination to capitalism marked not by the Church’s renunciation of the Holy Land but the state’s confiscation of Church lands. It is the proletariat who has yielded their subsistence from the land and was consigned to a new state of vagabondage without any means of production who became itinerant wage earners selling their labor to those with the capital to buy forming a class unto themselves. Marx uses the idea of original sin as a synonym for primitive accumulation that dispels the people from the Garden of Eden (the land and means of production.) But for Marx, the revolution was not a turning back toward the conditions of the Garden of Eden but affecting a rupture that would make all turning back impossible. Once broken off from medieval Christendom or feudal serfdom, the trajectory is free to head toward the ultimate goal of either ideational absolute consciousness or material classless ‘self-activity.’ According to this narrative, Hamlet’s disinheritance provides the necessary precondition for his attempt at self-emancipation.
Marx found his own century “still journeying through purgatory,” always in danger of turning back. It is here that Marx plays on the double meaning of revolution. He describes first the social and political revolutions of the past building toward the imminent revolution of the future. The word then shifts from its original reference to the recursive movements of celestial orbits and away from its modern sense of a violent break from the past. Hamlet, constrained by this constant stuttering and forward movement is always in danger of turning back from his duty to avenge his father’s death.
Hamlet is “trapped in dialectical conflict,” and he is in the stage of the spirit’s war with itself, but Hamlet, “at the beginning of the modern period, can only go so far.” Hamlet “cannot take the final step of quitting contemplation for activity thereby realizing himself through the self-expressive and self-determined action that is the consummation of Hegelian history.” For Hegel, Hamlet was too early and did not have the mental framework through which to manifest his will. Hamlet is however, vital for showing us the path for progress that is constantly reinterpreted by each successive generation. Even Nietzsche, who loathed the Hegelian principle that places modern man at the pinnacle of human history, placed Hamlet at the vanguard of his Dionysian ideal seeing in Hamlet the self-negating capacity to penetrate into reality; where understanding outweighs every motive for action.
In Hamlet’s failure to kill Claudius, Hegel finds Hamlet’s great failure. The paragon of modernity goes forward to manifest his interior world in the external. However, Hamlet’s quest is decided by fate rather than will.
In the following section I will revisit Hegel’s conceptions of philosophy and art and the ways they translate into the idea of what it means to be human.
IV. Reaching Conclusions: Art and Philosophy in Hegel
Hegel’s philosophy of art is not just a philosophical standpoint from which to view art, rather, it is continuous with what the art itself has been doing: expressing, reflecting, valuating, and enlivening norms and concepts. Hegel regards aesthetic expression to be just as indispensable for philosophical reflection as philosophical reflection is for the completion of aesthetic expression.
In charting a course in his Lectures on Fine Arts, Hegel characterizes the types of art and emanating from the art was a certain idea. Symbolic art, for example, described the indeterminacy of its ideas and the attribution of the meaning of human activity to something beyond human consciousness. The limitation of symbolic and classic art is that it was restricted to the “sphere of art” and focused on the right concrete form for the “infinite subjectivity of the Idea.” This form of artistic expression attempted to give sensuous form to the Idea. This restriction to the activity’s form meant the art could not be free and in this way failed to represent the Geist. It was necessary to disconnect art from the emphasis on the “beautiful” in order for art to reflect society. For Hegel, the modern form of art was the romantic characterized as the “deep feeling where absolute subjective personality moved free in itself and in the spiritual world.”
The distinctions between the art form is relevant not for purposes of chronology but rather as an example of historical development. There is a recognition that certain practices and ideas were not always represented. How and why they emerge calls for explanation. Hegel’s account of this historical development is meant to provide an explanation so when Hegel turns to forms of art, he turns toward a consideration of these as reflective historical practices or a self-critical process as the artist stands within the world of reflection and cannot abstract himself from it. Art emerges and unfolds through historical developments. These can be retrospectively examined to describe the dialectical movement of their history. This retrospective view has the effect of seeming destined, as if something was always going to happen because it happened, justified by this tautology. What is more interesting is explaining what those particular epochs signaled for modern ideas of consciousness.
Hegel’s focus is on the characterization of Geist, which represents the movement toward the Absolute Spirit of Consciousness. This spirit is expressed in our reasons for acting affording us the chance to see ourselves as agents connected in a fundamental way to the past providing a provisional understanding of our role in the world. This also gives agency to the individual in deciding their future. This is the quest that Hamlet embarked on. Freed from the constraints of his past life, he stared into the abyss of uncertainty and through his rationalism and deliberation contemplated life into action. It is this last step where Hamlet fails, and for Hegel this was Hamlet’s destiny as he stood on the doorstep of modernity. Hamlet could only go so far because the time was not ripe for the next stage. Philosophy needed Descartes, Kant, and Hegel himself while religion needed Luther to make the great next great leap.
In examining Hegel’s ideas, there is often the question of Hegel as a philosopher of reconciliation declaring that he had reached “the end of history” in his interpretations of philosophy, art, and religion. Hegel described the dialectic in his Encyclopedia where he described three stages of spirit that begins with the subjective individual. The next expression is the movement to the objective that emerges within the group consciousness of human communities represented by laws and social norms culminating in the Absolute Spirit that emerges within the expression of art, religion, and philosophy. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel describes how human history constitutes the development of Absolute Spirit that transcends everything that came before.
This human freedom had been realized with romantic art as the form in the process of transcending itself and actualized art in its end as a significant vehicle of human self-knowledge that is transferrable and collectively known. The link between the two is Hegel’s theodicy included the prominent role of the Absolute, or God’s self-actualization in time, accounting for the rationality and the culmination of political and intellectual history.
The thing is, art, philosophy, and religion have not stopped, but rather have continued to develop in a sort of revolution of coming together and fractionalizing in the contemporary psyche. The time is out of joint and we no longer understand consciousness as a constant flow of perception. Instead, modern consciousness is characterized by fracturing and uncertainty. The criticisms of Hegel often center around his uncompromising and “totalizing” rationalism, and his failure to do justice to the concrete particularity of human existence as well as notably, failing to explain the unreason in human action and contingency in historical change and the phenomena of interests in psychoanalysis, like Lacan’s Other and Freud’s Oedipal complex.
Hegel convinced many that philosophy, like art, must have a historically diagnostic task even while many rejected Hegel’s “idealism” and his conclusions about where we are in such a process. The historical world that developed after 1831 and after the twentieth century is difficult to make sense of in Hegelian terms and it is not possible to extend a Hegelian analysis to such reason-defeating phenomena as Nazism, Stalin, and communist China full of billionaires. The crux of modernity’s problem is the ontological issue of “subjectivity:” what it is to be a thinking, knowing and also acting and intentional subject in a material world.
There are four main answers in today’s “ideological-philosophical field:”
(i) Scientific naturalism (Darwin and neuroscience);
(ii) Discursive historicism (Foucault, deconstruction);
(iii) New Age Western Buddhism; or
(iv) Some sort of transcendental finitude (Heidegger)
Slavoj Žižek says these miss the point and the correct one he calls the idea of a “pre-transcendental gap or rupture” and this framework is what actually “designates the very core of modern subjectivity.”
Negativity in the ontological status means nonbeing, what is not. In the simplest sense this is the intentionality of consciousness and the ontological status of agency. Consciousness is not a wholly positive phenomenon in this way of looking at things. Consciousness contains both what is and the drive for that action that does not entirely manifest as intended. In making the intention, at the same time, the perceptual content is negated. The closest first approximation is Aristotelian subjectivity of thinking and acting as the distinct being-at-work (Hegelian Wirklichkeit) of the biological life-form that is human substance. Spontaneously mediated consciousness is the distinct being-at-work of human substance, not its actualization. But, it’s implausible also to think that every act of consciousness is an act of self-consciousness as well. There are in fact two acts, not always present, of consciousness of the object and consciousness of the subject aware of the object. The important Hegelian claim is that this is not so, there is only one act. For Zizek, this means “there is only the absolute Different, the self repelling gap,” between idealism and its mediation.
Thus, the characterization of Hegel as an idealist is in part a mischaracterization and we should view his fidelity to rationalism as playing the “game of giving and asking for reasons,” which introduces the crux of Hegel’s historical narrative: is it plausible to claim that we are progressing in the positive sense of the word, at justifying ourselves to each other, or is the frightening perspective that we are giving wrong answers?
On whose authority are we to rely on in relying on reason? There is no guarantor of at least the possibility of any resolution of skepticism through reason, and the frightening possibility of self-deceit emerges. There seems to be the emergence of the idea that the very notion of modernity is catalyzed by this loss. It is then a losing that notion of loss which becomes paradoxically, a gain.
Turning back to Hamlet, his experience is not the final picture of consciousness catalyzed by the loss of his kingdom that freed him. In Hamlet’s loss he gained and stood on the precipice between the medieval and modern. However, he fails, but Hamlet’s experience is not the final picture of consciousness; it continues. New and newer still psychological explanations emerge to account for the symptom of the delay and this constructs an understanding of the Geist of that moment in history. Hamlet’s epochal interiority is produced to answer his delay, which is constantly reinterpreted as we seek to explain our purpose and on whose authority this purpose emanates. But, art belongs to those who interpret it and for this reason we are thankful to have the timeless classics that continue to befuddle each successive generation. It is through our interpretations that we reveal the Geist of our times that builds on the past in the persistent passage of time.
V. The Bones in the Concept
So where do we go from here, how is the project of self-realization from Hegel manifested in the world, and what is the culmination of the progress toward Absolute Consciousness?
The central thesis of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, co-written by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer during WWII, argued that the domination of nature by the power of human reason led to the subjugation of human nature itself. Where instrumental reason had sacrificed self-reflexivity of reason in the pursuit of technical progress and it was seen that there was no escape from the power of nature or from the human propensity to mythologize that relation. This self-mystifying power of thought was inherited from Hegel and it entailed the idea that historical progress becomes the affirmation of the status quo in the sense that what is, is as the result of progressive history.
In Adorno’s lectures in 1964–65, he attempted to explain to his students why consciousness is not simply identical with free action referring to Hamlet as a figure absorbed in his own reflections to a degree that rendered him incapable of action he believed to be right. Thus, Hamlet becomes the character of the modern division between reason and nature motivated in part by the loss of “a deep spiritual, psychic and social need for a sense of place and a sense of belonging.”
Hamlet is driven not by external agents but the prompting of his ‘prophetic soul,’ the seed of ruin is contained within him, and we will go on interpreting him to satisfy the demands of our times.
 De Grazia, Margreta. “Hamlet before Its Time.” MLQ: Modern Language Quarterly, vol. 62 no. 4, 2001, p. 355–375, 355. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/22909.
 Id. at 363.
 Quotations of Hamlet follow Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor’s Revised edition for the Arden Shakespeare (London and New York: Methuen, 2016).
 Mackenzie, Henry, Mirror (Edinburgh), 18 April 1780, in CR, 1:270.
 De Grazia, “Hamlet before Its Time,” at 364.
 De Grazia, “Hamlet before Its Time,” at 364.
 Id. at 166.
 Derrida, Jacques, “Freud and the Scene of Writing” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1993), 214.
 Id. 257.
 Bradley, A. C., “Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy” in Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London and New York: Macmillan, 1965), 69–95.
 Freud, Sigmund, “An Autobiographical Study in The Freud Reader,” ed. Peter Gay (New York and London: W. W Norton, 1989), 18.
 Freud, Sigmund, “The Interpretation of Dreams in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud,” ed. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), 310.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole’”, 259.
 Id. at 260.
 De Grazia, Margreta, “Hamlet without Hamlet,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 164.
 Jones, Ernest, “Hamlet and Oedipus” (New York: Norton, 1976), 52.
 Lacan, Jacques, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” trans. James Hulbert, in Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise, Shoshana Felman, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982), 11–52.
 Lacan, 15, 39, and 49.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole,’” at 251.
 De Grazia, Margreta, “Hamlet without Hamlet,” at 23.
 Karl Marx’s speech of 14 April 1856 on the anniversary of the Chartist People’s Paper, quoted here from S. S. Prawer Karl Marx and World Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 246.
 Marx and Engels, Vie German Ideology: Part I in Tucker, ed., 146–200, esp. 164.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole,’” at 253.
 Georg W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Sirnson, 3 vols. (Lincoln and London: U of Nebraska P, 1995), 3:546.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole,’” at 251.
 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 103.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole,’” at 251.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Fine Art, at 331.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole’”, 255.
 Id at 254.
 De Grazia, “Hamlet before Its Time,” at 367.
 Marx, Karl, “The Eighteenth Brumairae of Louis Bonaparte” (New York: International Publishers, 1969), at 121.
 De Grazia, Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole’, at 253.
 Hegel, Philosophy of History, at 55.
 De Grazia, “Teleology, Delay, and the ‘Old Mole’”, at 256.
 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin, 1993), at 39.
 Kottman, Paul A. “Reaching Conclusions: Art and Philosophy in Hegel and Shakespeare.” The Insistence of Art: Aesthetic Philosophy After Early Modernity, edited by Paul A. Kottman, Fordham University Press, New York, 2017, pp. 116–139, 118. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1x76fts.8. Accessed 20 Feb. 2021.
 Id. at 119.
 Id. at 121
 Hegel, Lectures on Fine Art, 78–79.
 Hegel, G. W. F. “Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,” vol. 2, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1236–37.
 Kottman, “Reaching Conclusions: Art and Philosophy in Hegel and Shakespeare,” 122.
 Id. at 130.
 Pippin, Robert “Back to Hegel?” Mediations 26.2 (Summer 2012) 1–22, 2.
 Id. at 2.
 See Žižek’s remarks on Hegel and contemporary finance capitalism (244). Perhaps Zadie Smith’s trenchant summary is the best: States now “de-regulate to privatize gain and re-regulate to nationalize loss.” NYR Blog, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jun/02/north-west-london-blues/, June 2, 1012.
 Pippin, “Back to Hegel?,” at 3.
 Žižek, Slavoj, “Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism,” London: Verso Press, (2012), 1038, 6–7.
 Pippin, “Back to Hegel?”, at 3.
 Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, 378.
 Brandom, Robert, “Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment” (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
 Pippin, “Back to Hegel?”, at 9.
 Pippin, “Back to Hegel?”, 16.
 Shoop, Casey. “The Bones in the Concept: Big History, Theodor Adorno and Second Nature.” History of the Present, vol. 6, no. 1, 2016, pp. 63–86, 68. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/historypresent.6.1.0063. Accessed 21 Feb. 2021.
 Id. at 69.
 Shoop, “The Bones in the Concept: Big History, Theodor Adorno and Second Nature,” at 71.
 David Christian, “Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History” (2004), at 2.